

23 April 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

Pursuant to our conversation of this morning, the attached paper contains a series of proposed recommendations which might be included at the end of the "Magnitude Paper", if DCI should elect to present specific proposals to NSC re the magnitude issue.

FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination

Encl.
Recommendations

DOCUMENT NO. _____
 DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES ☐
☐ CLASS. NO. _____
 CLASS. NO. _____ 02011
 RECD. FROM _____
 AUTH. _____
 DATE: 7 APR 1981 _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/08/04 : CIA-RDP80R01731R001100100008-5

DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (D) 2011

NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR 10-2

DATE: 7 APR 1981

REVIEWER: RECOMMENDATIONS

(assuming DCI elects to make specific proposals to NSC)

25X1

It is recommended:

- a. That in view of the Magnitude issue as well as the guidance needed to give proper direction to stepped up covert operations, the NSC conduct a comprehensive review of the covert operations situation.
- b. That the above review include a restatement or redetermination as appropriate of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in U. S. covert operations.
- c. That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of the decision to place covert operational responsibility within CIA - CIA should be guaranteed all necessary support from other agencies of the government to insure the successful discharge of this responsibility including the following specific assurances:
 - (1) More specific provisions for joint planning with the military for covert support of military operations, spelling out a clear delineation of authorities, duties and responsibilities.
 - (2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where the same covert apparatus is being developed to engage in high priority cold war missions as well as to be available to the military in the event of overt war.
 - (3) More specific provision for insuring determination by the State Department on the important foreign policy and political considerations involved, including specifically, machinery through which the degree of necessity or desirability of proposed covert operations is spelled out from a foreign policy standpoint.
 - (4) Specific provisions to insure that the type and quantities of administrative and logistical support required of other governmental departments and agencies for the prosecution of the covert effort will be forthcoming as necessary. This support should include high level, capable political and military personnel.
- d. That where policy guidance for covert operations is of concern to more than one department, this guidance be coordinated and issued to CIA by the new Psychological Strategy Board.
- e. That NSC 10/2 be revised to reflect the current policy of the National Security Council on scope and pace of covert operations, as well as to clarify certain passages of that document which have been rendered obsolete by developments.

TOP SECRET

23 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

**SUBJECT : Recommendations to Accompany
Magnitude Paper**

Pursuant to our conversation of this morning, the attached paper contains a series of proposed recommendations which might be included at the end of the "Magnitude Paper", if DCI should elect to present specific proposals to NSC re the magnitude issue.

**FRANK G. WISNER
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination**

**Encl.
Recommendations**

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS: ☐
☐ CLASSIFIED
CLASS. OR DECLASS. TO: TS, S **2011**
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: MC 10-2
DATE: **7 APR 1961** REVIEWER:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS
☐ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS 1 2011
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2011
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE: 1 APR 1981 REVIEWER:

RECOMMENDATIONS

(assuming DCI elects to make specific proposals to NSC)

25X1

It is recommended:

a. That in view of the Magnitude issue as well as the guidance needed to give proper direction to stepped up covert operations, the NSC conduct a comprehensive review of the covert operations situation.

b. That the above review include a restatement or redetermination as appropriate of the several responsibilities and authorities involved in U. S. covert operations.

c. That if the above review results in a reaffirmation of the decision to place covert operational responsibility within CIA - CIA should be guaranteed all necessary support from other agencies of the government to insure the successful discharge of this responsibility including the following specific assurances:

(1) More specific provisions for joint planning with the military for covert support of military operations, spelling out a clear delineation of authorities, duties and responsibilities.

(2) Specific guidance for dealing with the military in fields where the same covert apparatus is being developed to engage in high priority cold war missions as well as to be available to the military in the event of overt war.

(3) More specific provision for insuring determination by the State Department on the important foreign policy and political considerations involved, including specifically, machinery through which the degree of necessity or desirability of proposed covert operations is spelled out from a foreign policy standpoint.

(4) Specific provisions to insure that the type and quantities of administrative and logistical support required of other governmental departments and agencies for the prosecution of the covert effort will be forthcoming as necessary. This support should include high level, capable political and military personnel.

d. That where policy guidance for covert operations is of concern to more than one department, this guidance be coordinated and issued to CIA by the new Psychological Strategy Board.

e. That NSC 10/2 be revised to reflect the current policy of the National Security Council on scope and pace of covert operations, as well as to clarify certain passages of that document which have been rendered obsolete by developments.

TOP SECRET

[illegible]

GPO
W-177